

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STOCKH 02527 131720Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
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R 131400Z JUN 77  
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 847  
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION NATO  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
AMEMBASSY OSLO  
USLO PEKING  
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 2527

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCPAC

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR, KS, US, SW  
SUBJECT: U.S. GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA

REF: STATE 130459

1. CHARGE AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR CALLED ON MFA SECRETARY  
GENERAL LEIFLAND JUNE 10 AND PRESENTED INFORMATION REGARDING  
US GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA AS GIVEN IN REFTEL.  
(APPOINTMENT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN MADE FOR COURTESY CALL  
ON LEIFLAND BY AMBASSADOR MARSHALL GREEN, AND WE  
TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THIS CALL TO HAVE DISCUSSION ON  
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KOREA.)

2. AS DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, LEIFLAND IS STRONGLY  
INTERESTED IN KOREAN AFFAIRS, HIS INTEREST STEMMING  
FROM SWEDEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE NEUTRAL NATIONS  
SUPERVISORY COMMISSION (NNSC) AND FROM HIS OWN VISITS  
TO BOTH HALVES OF THE COUNTRY. LEIFLAND EXPRESSED

APPRECIATION FOR OUR PRESENTATION, AND SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO RESPOND TO OUR INVITATION FOR COMMENTS. HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) SWEDEN SHARED THE HOPE THAT IN AN IDEAL WORLD, ALL FOREIGN TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM EVERYWHERE. SINCE IT WAS NOT AN IDEAL WORLD, AND SINCE FOR EXAMPLE THERE WERE SOVIET TROOPS IN EASTERN EUROPE, SWEDEN ACCEPTED THE PRESENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, OF US TROOPS IN WESTERN EUROPE. AS FOR KOREA, SWEDEN HAD NEVER HAD OBJECTIONS TO US TROOPS THERE, BELIEVING STRONGLY THAT THEY WERE CARRYING OUT AN ESSENTIAL MISSION. IF ANYTHING HAS CONTRIBUTED TO STABILITY IN KOREA, IT HAS BEEN THE STRONG US TROOP PRESENCE.

(B) SWEDISH CONTACTS WITH THE CHINESE HAVE CONSISTENTLY INDICATED THAT PEKING ACCEPTS THE PRESENCE OF US MILITARY FORCES. LEIFLAND HAZARDED THE GUESS THAT THE CHINESE WOULD NOT BE PLEASED WITH US WITHDRAWAL PLANS, EVEN IF THEY COULD NOT SAY SO DIRECTLY.

(C) ONE IMPORTANT FACT WAS THAT US GROUND FORCES HAD BEEN LOCATED BETWEEN THE DMZ AND SEOUL, SO THAT ANY NORTH KOREAN ATTACK WOULD NECESSARILY INVOLVE THE US. THE CHANGE IN THIS SITUATION WOULD HAVE SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE ROK AND THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE. OF COURSE SWEDEN ASSUMED NEVERTHELESS THAT THE US COMMITMENT REPRESENTED BY REMAINING USAF AND USN UNITS MEANT THAT ANY ATTEMPTED ATTACK BY NORTH KOREA WOULD RESULT IN IMMEDIATE US INVOLVEMENT.

(D) WITH REGARD TO GOS CRITICISM OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA, IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT, IN CONFIDENTIAL

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LEIFLAND'S OPINION, THAT THE US ARMED FORCES RADIO COMPLEX IN SOUTH KOREA REMAIN INTACT. THE SOUTH KOREAN PRESS AND ROK RADIO WERE MOUTHPIECES FOR PARK, SO ARMED FORCES RADIO WAS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE MEANS THAT SOUTH KOREANS HAD OF GETTING THE TRUTH.

(E) THE NORTH KOREANS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY ATTRIBUTE THE US WITHDRAWAL TO THE NORTH-KOREAN-SPONSORED KOREA RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE UNGA IN 1975 CALLING FOR US WITHDRAWAL.

(F) THE GOS WOULD BE GLAD TO SHARE WHATEVER REACTIONS TO THE US WITHDRAWAL IT COLLECTS FROM COMMUNIST SOURCES.

3. IN DISCUSSION, LEIFLAND SAID THE SWEDES BELIEVED BOTH MOSCOW AND PEKING WISHED CONTINUED STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE ANY NORTH KOREAN MOVES AGAINST THE SOUTH. HOWEVER, LEIFLAND CAST DOUBT BOTH ON MOSCOW'S AND PEKING'S DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER PYONGYANG AND, MORE ESSENTIALLY, OVER KIM IL SUNG'S RATIONALITY. AS IN PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS, HE INDICATED THAT HE

PERSONALLY HAD LITTLE FAITH IN THE RATIONALITY OF DECISIONS TO BE EXPECTED FROM KIM. (LEIFLAND SHOULD OBVIOUSLY BE PROTECTED ON THIS AND OTHER SENSITIVE STATEMENTS.)

4. COMMENT. LEIFLAND SPOKE AT LENGTH AND FRANKLY BECAUSE, WE BELIEVE, HE VIEWS SWEDEN'S ROLE IN THE NNSC AS GIVING SWEDEN A DIRECT INTEREST IN THE STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY. ALTHOUGH HE MEASURED HIS WORDS CAREFULLY, HIS STRESS ON THE ESSENTIAL ROLE THAT US TROOPS HAD PLAYED IN KOREAN STABILITY IN THE PAST, AND HIS DOUBTS ABOUT THE RATIONALITY OF DECISION-MAKING IN PYONGYANG, INDICATED TO US THAT HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE US TROOP WITHDRAWAL. WE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THIS AS PRIMARILY A FOREIGN MINISTRY VIEW, SINCE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE GOS OR PUBLIC OPINION WILL GET INVOLVED IN THIS QUESTION;  
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HOWEVER, IT IS A VERY WELL-INFORMED VIEW. LEIFLAND'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON AT THE END OF JUNE WILL PROVIDE FURTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSIONS ON KOREA.  
PERRY

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCPAC.

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